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NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAWS: UTILITARIANISM FOR DINNER,
DESERT FOR DESSERT
William C. Shubeck*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine your favorite dish; think of its ingredients. Consider how
each ingredient has a unique role, all in the name of the finished product.
Next, consider the consequences of adjusting the quantity of each
ingredient. Adding an extra pinch of salt may not do much, but what if
the adjustment is to triple the red pepper flakes? The right combination
of ingredients creates a hybrid of culinary cornerstones such as salt, fat,
and acid, but the dish’s ultimate success hinges on one thing: balance.
Throwing your dish out of balance could lead to an inedible product, and
an insatiable hunger could impact areas well outside your kitchen. The
criminal justice system is like a successful dish: competing ingredients
are combined to pursue a balanced product. The main difference from
eating your favorite dish, however, is that over two million people are
seated at this table. As of 2019, “[t]he American criminal justice system
holds almost 2.3 million people in 1,719 state prisons, 109 federal
prisons, 1,772 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,163 local jails, and 80
Indian Country jails as well as in military prisons, immigration detention
facilities, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and
prisons in the U.S.”1 In New Jersey alone, there are 19,212 individuals
incarcerated in the prison system.2 Of those 19,212 incarcerated
individuals, 14,660 are incarcerated under mandatory minimum
sentences.3 This mandatory minimum sentencing in New Jersey is
implemented, in part, by a specific piece of criminal legislation: the New
Jersey No Early Release Act (“NERA”).
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1 Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
2 Offender Statistics, STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, https://www.state.
nj.us/corrections/pdf/offender_statistics/2019/Entire%20Report%20-%20Offender
%20Characteristics%20Report.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
3 Id.
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This Comment will dive into various stages of the New Jersey
criminal justice system, with a focus on the theoretical justifications for
punishment. Part II will provide an in-depth review of the common
justifications for punishment. Part III will examine specific aspects of
the New Jersey criminal justice system and illustrate how these aspects
evince a hybrid scheme with distinct retributivist qualities, though still
skews toward the utilitarian end of the spectrum. Part IV will discuss
NERA’s framework and impact in New Jersey. This Comment argues
that NERA’s potentially overly retributive structure creates an
inconsistency in the New Jersey criminal justice system. This
inconsistency arises because other key areas of the system (such as
parole and expungement) create a hybrid scheme that considers
culpability and blameworthiness while still emphasizing rehabilitative
goals that increase public safety. Thus, the overarching conclusion is
that NERA’s lack of utilitarian values may hinder the overall
maximization of public safety in New Jersey. Accordingly, Part V will
note potential changes to NERA, and Part VI will conclude.
Before the discussion proceeds, however, it should be noted that
analysis of any area of criminal law is a sensitive process. Assessing
whether punishment practices are efficient and acceptable does not
make light of crime or provide offenders with any special treatment.
Rather, taking a step back and assessing how a system approaches
punishment may lead to a more productive equal justice system. Judge
Posner of the Seventh Circuit has noted:
[W]e should have a realistic conception of the composition of
the prison and jail population before deciding that they are a
scum entitled to nothing better than what a vengeful populace
and a resource-starved penal system choose to give them. We
must not exaggerate the distance between “us,” the lawful
ones, the respectable ones, and the prison and jail population;
for such exaggeration will make it too easy for us to deny that
population the rudiments of humane consideration.4
II. PUNISHMENT THEORY
Punishment theory uses moral and societal considerations to
justify the imposition of punishments, such as imprisonment. The
primary justifications of punishment under this theory are retributivism
and utilitarianism.5 Briefly stated, retributivist justifications are that (1)
4

Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
5 It should be noted here that both justifications contain sub-approaches, meaning
that painting either justification with a broad brush is not advised. This discussion will
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punishment is justified because people deserve it; and (2) the purpose
of punishment is to give an offender what he deserves (hence the phrase
“just deserts”).6 Under the utilitarian approach, also referred to as
“consequentialist,” or “instrumentalist,” punishment is justified by the
useful purposes that it serves.7 These justifications, along with their
strengths and weaknesses, will be explained further below.
A. What is Punishment?
Though one can easily identify incarceration as punishment, other
side effects of incarceration (such as a lasting criminal record after
release) may also be punishment.8 A prominent commentator on
aspects of punishment, Kent Greenawalt, simplified the notion of
punishment into six features:
First, “[punishment] is performed by, and directed at, agents
who are responsible in some sense. God and humans can
punish; hurricanes cannot. People, but not faulty television
sets, are fit subjects of punishment.” Second, it involves
“designedly” harmful or unpleasant consequences. Third, the
unpleasant consequences usually are “preceded by a judgment
of condemnation; the subject of punishment is explicitly
blamed for committing a wrong.” Fourth, it is imposed by one
who has authority to do so. Fifth, it is imposed for a breach of
some established rule of behavior. Finally, it is imposed on an
actual or supposed violator of the rule of behavior.9
This framework, however, only shows us whether something is or is not
punishment.
Exhibiting these features—thus being labeled as
“punishment”—is not a sufficient condition for justification; rather, it is
a necessary one.
B. Utilitarian Justification of Punishment
One important aspect of the utilitarian justification of punishment
is the desire for a net societal benefit: “[u]pon the principle of utility, if
[punishment] ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in
not delve into these sub-approaches, and to avoid mislabeling, the discussion will keep
things to a birds-eye view of retributivism and utilitarianism.
6 KENT GREENAWALT, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282, 1284 (Joshua Dressler
ed., 2d ed. 2002).
7 Id.
8 The conclusion that things such as a criminal record are automatically
“punishment” is not universally accepted, and it is the source of many philosophical
discussions in the criminal law sphere. Such discussions do not fall within the ambit of
this Comment, though.
9 JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (7th ed.
2015) (quoting GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1282–83).

SHUBECK (DO NOT DELETE)

542

11/5/2020 10:27 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:539

as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.”10 Thus, the utilitarian
goal of this net societal benefit is sought via seven means, described
below.
1. General Deterrence
Simply put, if people know they will be punished for an act, and
they assess that the punishment outweighs the perceived benefit of that
act, they will avoid doing it.11 General deterrence is not thwarted just
because people commit the act that is sought to be curtailed.12 Out of all
seven of the utilitarian means, however, it is general deterrence that
seems to value the severity of punishment the most according to
Greenawalt:
With a properly developed penal code, the benefits to be
gained from criminal activity would be outweighed by the
harms of punishment, even when those harms were
discounted by the probability of avoiding detection.
Accordingly, the greater the temptation to commit a particular
crime and the smaller the chance of detection, the more severe
the penalty should be.13
Additionally, the sheer knowledge that society punishes a certain action
goes a long way to achieve the general deterrence sought by utilitarians;
this is true even when a potential actor does not even believe he is likely
to be caught.14
2. Individual Deterrence
Individual deterrence differs from general deterrence in two ways:
(1) the deterrent effect does not present itself until after punishment,
and (2) the deterrent effect is concentrated solely on punishing the actor
rather than affecting the wider population.15 Like general deterrence,
however, the severity of the administered punishment is considered,

10 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 134
(1999).
11 GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1286.
12 Id. (“The person who has already committed a crime cannot, of course, be
deterred from committing that crime, but his punishment may help deter others.”).
13 Id.
14 Id. (“Seeing others punished for certain behavior can create in people a sense of
association between punishment and act (sic) that may constrain them even when they
are sure they will not get caught. Adults, as well as children, may subconsciously fear
punishment even though rationally they are confident it will not occur.”).
15 Id. at 1287 (“Adults are more able than small children to draw conclusions from
the punishment of others, but having a harm befall oneself is almost always a sharper
lesson than seeing the same harm occur to others.”).
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and an increase in severity is required in some cases, such as those
involving repeat offenders.16
3. Norm Reinforcement
This is not a strong tenet of utilitarian justification for punishment,
but it is certainly present. Simply put, when someone is punished for
doing (or not doing) an act, the punishment reinforces our belief that
the act is bad and contrary to the normative values that we should
possess.17 “Serious criminal punishment represents society’s strong
condemnation of what the offender has done, and performs a significant
role in moral education.”18
4. Incapacitation
Incapacitation is likely what most people think of when they
envision criminal punishment. But utilitarian justifications are not
solely intended to give the individual what he deserves; rather, the
incapacitation is implemented to hide the actor away and prevent any
further physical contact with the public—i.e., public safety via
separation.19 To note, though, there are two aspects of utilitarian
incapacitation that stand apart from what is traditionally thought of as
the retributivist “just-deserts” imprisonment. Many utilitarians (1)
emphasize “other forms” of risk management within this umbrella of
incapacitation, some being probation or parole (with additional
obligations such as drug testing) and (2) know that incapacitation may
not always be the answer, especially when the actor is replaced in the
public under a “next-man-up” type scheme (e.g., the drug dealer’s
replacement), or when the imprisonment impacts the actor in such a
way as to make him more dangerous once he is released back into the
public.20 This last point will be expanded upon shortly, as there are a
few instances where utilitarians believe the punishment (which, in
some cases, maybe imprisonment) is not justified.

16 Id. (“To deter an offender from repeating his actions, a penalty should be severe
enough to outweigh in his mind the benefits of the crime. For the utilitarian, more severe
punishment of repeat offenders is warranted partly because the first penalty has shown
itself ineffective . . . .”).
17 GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1286–87.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1287.
20 Id.
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5. Reform
This specific goal will be heavily emphasized throughout this
Comment. The goal of “reform” under the utilitarian framework is to
make the actor a better person through punishment, which, in turn, will
make him a healthy and productive member of society.21 Here, the
actual punishment is geared toward yielding a more productive, healthy
individual. As such, the “punishment” takes the form of education or
vocational training.22 “Thus,” Professor Francis T. Cullen says, “the
rehabilitative ideal draws its power from its nobility and its
rationality—from the promise that compassionate science, rather than
vengeful punishment, is the road to reducing crime. Rehabilitation
allows us to be a better and safer people . . . .”23
6. Vengeance
Vengeance is self-explanatory. It cannot (and should not) be
overlooked that there is utilitarian value placed upon the overall notion
of vengeance. Though this will look similar to the retributivist
justification of punishment, the true justification (or utilitarian
argument in support) of vengeance is that it “increase[s] the happiness,
or reduce[s] the unhappiness, of those who want the offender
punished.”24 Greenawalt points to two other values that vengeance
carries within the utilitarian framework: (1) by allowing the victims to
enact their vengeance through society’s imposition of punishment, it
increases their respect for the law; and (2) if society enacts punishment
upon the actor, the associated victims will be satiated, in a sense, and it
will dissuade them from carrying out their own acts of private selfhelp.25 Note, again, these are added layers to the justification that the
retributivist camp does not deem as necessary.
7. Community and Victim Restoration
Unlike reform, which focuses on the punished actor, this final
justification of punishment focuses on those affected by that actor.26
This aim has gained much traction recently under the term “restorative

21

Id.
Id.
23 Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST. 299, 310
(2013).
24 GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1287.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1287–88.
22
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justice.”27 Restorative justice entails an overall healing process that
centers on a level of contriteness exhibited by the actor, which, in turn,
is accepted by the victim and/or wider community, leading to
forgiveness and repair.28 While some of the aforementioned means can
be tied together with the aim of restoration, Greenawalt points out one
specific aim that is replaced or quieted by restoration: vengeance.29
C. Instances in Which Punishment Cannot Be Justified from a
Utilitarian Perspective
Keeping in mind the overarching “net societal good” proposition
upon which utilitarian justification for punishment sits, scholars have
identified four hurdles that a punishment must overcome before it can
enter into the club of justified punishments under utilitarian
principles.30 Jeremy Bentham articulates these hurdles, and, in doing so,
he frames them within the context of mischief. “[M]ischief,” according
to Bentham, is not necessarily solely confined to the virtually innocuous
acts committed by children on October 30th; rather, “mischief” is any
act that subtracts from societal happiness.31 Further, Bentham points
out that the wrongful act that brings about the punishment—as well as
the punishment itself—detract from societal happiness; thus, both the
punishment and the punished act are, in this regard, mischief.32 To
frame the mischief analysis, therefore, within the “net societal good”
goal of utilitarian justification, the implementation of punishment must
not leave the overall balance of mischief higher than it would have been
if no punishment had been implemented at all.33 Thus, the four hurdles
that would immediately fail the mischief analysis arise when the
punishment is (1) groundless, (2) inefficacious, (3) unprofitable, or (4)
needless.34
Under the first hurdle, punishment is groundless (and, thus, not
justifiable) when no mischief has occurred.35 The most common
example of this (it may be the sole example, as it was the only one
Bentham articulated) is consent: if there was consent for the actor to
27

Id. at 1288.
Id.
29 Id. (“Restorative measures can also be seen as a means of deflecting the desires of
victims and the public for vengeance, and providing a more constructive outlet for such
feelings.”).
30 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 134.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 134–38.
35 Id. at 134.
28
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conduct his “wrongful” act, then he has committed no wrong, and there
is nothing to punish (no “mischief”).36
Any risk regarding the second hurdle is usually cleared so long as
(1) the violated law in question actually applied to the actor, and (2) the
actor actually violated the law.37 In reality, the only times this hurdle
cannot be met will be when issues are triggered related to (1) ex post
facto laws; (2) lack of proper notice; (3) an inability to form the requisite
mens rea (infancy, intoxication, insanity); (4) additional shortcomings
regarding the mens rea (mistake or lack of intent); (5) external
influences implicating duress, self-defense, or necessity; and (6) an
inability to satisfy the actus reus of the offense (lack of voluntary
action).38
The “unprofitable” hurdle cannot be met if the imposition of any
punishment in response to the proscribed act can never result in the net
societal good.39 This specific hurdle (like the prior two) will not play
much of a role in this Comment.
Unfortunately, there is not much discussion about the “needless”
hurdle, but it is likely to be triggered when analyzing NERA’s fit in the
current New Jersey criminal justice system. In short, Bentham says that
the punishment in question will be needless (and thus not justifiable)
“[w]here the purpose of putting an end to the practice may be attained
as effectually at a cheaper rate.”40 This reinforces the notion of the net
societal good and adds a layer of efficiency: not only do we want to
achieve that net societal good through our punishment but we also want
to maximize that net good.
It is important to always remember that the utilitarian scheme is
focused on achieving the greater good end via the punishment mean.41
Consequently, much of the aims of utilitarian punishment (restoration,
reformation, etc.), while applicable to wide swaths of the population,
lead to an individualization of the assessment regarding what (and how
much) punishment to implement.42 This leads to “long confinement for

36

BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 134–35.
See id. at 135–37.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 137–38.
40 Id. at 138.
41 GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1288. (“[T]he acts for which criminal punishment
should be authorized are those with respect to which the good consequences of
punishment can outweigh the bad; the persons who should be punished are those whom
it is useful to punish; and the severity of punishment should be determined not by some
abstract notion of deserts but by marginal usefulness.”).
42 Id.
37
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those judged irredeemably antisocial, and to rehabilitation and prompt
release for those whose character can be positively transformed.”43
D. Retributivism
1. Brief History of Retributivism’s Return to Prominence
Though retributivism’s popularity and public acceptance have
fluctuated over the recent decades, its return to prominence in the midto-late 1970s is of particular interest to this discussion because its rise
came coupled with a sharp decline in the acceptance of rehabilitative
(utilitarian) goals.44 According to Cullen’s research, this decline in the
belief of rehabilitation was facilitated by (1) an overall distrust in the
system to be able to rehabilitate offenders, and (2) negative public
feelings associated with the concept of rehabilitating rather than
punishing offenders.45 Regarding distrust in the system, Cullen points
to three sub-issues, two of which deserve special note: (1) the adequacy
of the prison environment to facilitate rehabilitation, and (2) the
ulterior motives of those in charge of “rehabilitation.”46
Cullen points to intrinsic shortcomings of the prison system as one
reason for its perceived inadequacy.47 Additionally, prison-based
emergencies in America during this time—such as the Attica riots of
1971—painted the system as something that did not even resemble one
associated with “corrections.”48 To make matters worse for those who
championed rehabilitation, the Stanford Prison Experiment49 seemed to
illustrate not only the lack of rehabilitative qualities of prison but also
the negative transformative qualities of it.50 On the ulterior motive
43

Id.
See Cullen, supra note 23, at 314 (“By the mid-1970s, it had become common to
ask, ‘Is rehabilitation dead?’”).
45 Id. at 314–18, 324–25.
46 Id. at 317–19.
47 Id. at 317 (“Custodial goals [in prisons]—the need to maintain order and to
prevent escapes—would always trump the therapeutic. Those in charge might give lip
service to rehabilitation, but their jobs hinged on keeping prisons quiet, not curing
offenders.”).
48 Id.
49 The Stanford Prison Experiment was a psychological study conducted in 1973.
What started as a seemingly innocuous study of the power dynamic between the student
guards and prisoners turned abusive and raised significant ethical concerns about the
propriety of the entire study. For more information on the Stanford Prison Experiment,
see Saul McLeod, The Stanford Prison Experiment, SIMPLY PSYCHOL. (last updated 2020),
https://www.simplypsychology.org/zimbardo.html.
50 Cullen, supra note 23, at 317–18 (quoting Philip G. Zimbardo et al., A Pirandellian
Prison: The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 8, 1973, at 56) (“If this could
happen in so short a time, . . . and if it could happen to the ‘cream-of-the-crop of
44
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point, Cullen points to a “mirage” of the system: there was no well-oiled
machine where judges methodically assessed risk factors and prison
officials systematically and carefully guided the offender through the
process; instead, malicious, racially prejudicial actions were taken by
those in power, and rehabilitation was but a false flag.51
The public’s negative perception of rehabilitation played a major
role in its decline, and that perception stemmed, in part, from public
sentiments regarding other supposedly “weak” links in society, such as
(1) single mothers (disrespectfully labeled as “welfare queens”52) being
able to receive benefits without having to join the workforce;53 (2) a
distancing from physical punishment in the schools plus a shift away
from traditional teaching curriculum;54 and (3) a lack of serious
punishment of young offenders.55 These societal judgments led people
to believe that rehabilitation was weak on crime: “Judges were placing
dangerous predators not in prison but back on the streets, and
kindhearted or duped parole boards were being conned into releasing
career criminals prematurely.”56 Thus, the shift toward desert-based
punishment that was tough on crime swung back in favor of
retributivism.
2. Retributivist Justifications for Punishment
As noted earlier, one of the main retributivist justifications for
punishment concerns only the culpability of the actor. To quote
commentator Michael S. Moore, “[t]he distinctive aspect of retributivism
is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish
him or her; the principle [that only those who are guilty should be
punished] make[s] such moral desert only a necessary condition of
punishment.”57 Regarding the prospect of these greater goods or
additional goals of punishment, Moore says that many retributivists
“ha[ve] no room” for them.58 “That future crime might also be prevented
by punishment is a happy surplus for a retributivist, but no part of the
American youth,’ then one can only shudder to imagine what society is doing both to the
actual guards and prisoners who are [in the real prison system].”).
51 Id. at 318.
52 Id. at 324.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Cullen, supra note 23, at 324.
57 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND
THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 180 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987);
DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 9, at 42.
58 Moore, supra note 57, at 180–81.
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justification for punishing.”59 To cement the notion that the actor’s
culpability and blameworthiness is justification in and of itself, Moore
explains that such blameworthiness does not merely justify the
imposition of punishment; rather, it impresses upon society the duty to
impose punishment.60
Though they do not expressly do away with the traditional
justification for punishment, Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton view
the retributivist justification for punishment from a different
perspective: bringing balance back to society.61 Murphy and Hampton
classify illegal wrongdoing as causing a victim to suffer, thus taking
something from that victim.62 The commentators note that “if [the
victim] cause[s] the wrongdoer to suffer in proportion to [the victim’s]
suffering at [the wrongdoer’s] hands, [the wrongdoer’s] elevation over
[the victim] is denied, and moral reality is reaffirmed.”63 At first glance,
this may seem to be utilitarian in nature: the punishment is proportional
to the suffering, and it is implemented to bring about balance, which
may be argued as a net good. This notion is quickly dispatched,
however, as Hampton firmly notes:
[E]ven in a situation where neither the wrongdoer nor society
will either listen to or believe the message about the victim’s
worth which the “punitive defeat” is meant to carry, and
where the victim doesn’t need to hear (or will not believe) that
message in order to allay any personal fears of diminishment,
the retributivist will insist on the infliction of punishment
insofar as it is a way of “striking a blow for morality” or (to use
a phrase of C.S. Lewis’s) a way to “plant the flag” of morality.64
Thus, it does not matter whether the victim will feel restored—
retributivist justifications demand punishment in the face of the wrong,
and that, alone, is sufficient.
III. NEW JERSEY PAROLE AND EXPUNGEMENT: A DASH OF RETRIBUTIVISM TO
THE UTILITARIAN MEAL
No sources found during the research for this Comment argue that
an effective criminal justice system can only embody or implement one
justification for punishment. Thus, systems that form a hybrid of both

59

Id. at 180.
Id. at 182.
61 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 124–28, 130 (1988); see
also DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 9, at 49–50.
62 MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 61, at 128–30.
63 Id. at 125.
64 Id. at 130.
60
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retributivist and utilitarian justifications could maintain a safe and
healthy society. This Part illustrates the hybrid nature of two key
aspects of the New Jersey criminal system (parole and expungement),
showing that a fair balance of retributivist and utilitarian purposes
allows for both just punishment and meaningful rehabilitation.
A. Parole
Parole’s hybrid nature can be seen in a few different ways. For
instance, determining whether an individual is entitled to parole turns,
in part, on his rehabilitation while incarcerated—an inquiry that has a
fairly distinct utilitarian flavor.65 On the other hand, we see a dash of
retributivist principles at play in certain facets of parole, such as the fact
that an individual is not eligible for parole until a certain point in his
incarceration. This Section will evaluate the overarching hybrid nature
of parole by examining three statutory provisions in New Jersey: (1)
Eligibility;66 (2) Supervision for Life;67 and (3) Victim Input.68
1. Parole Eligibility
Whether an individual is granted parole turns on a set of primarily
utilitarian-geared factors. Whether (and when) the individual is eligible
to seek parole at all, however, is a horse of a different color; indeed, it
seems to be part of the dash of retributivism that gives parole its hybrid
flavor. For example, under the parole eligibility provision, if an
individual is sentenced to life imprisonment without any mandatory
minimum sentence, he is eligible for parole after serving 25 years.69
Alternatively, if an individual is sentenced to a non-life term without any
mandatory minimum sentence, he is eligible for parole after serving
one-third of the imposed sentence.70 A 2002 informational article titled
“A Brief Overview of the Parole Process in New Jersey” outlines the
many utilitarian factors taken into account by the Parole Board when
determining whether an individual is eligible for parole.71 Employing
what appears to be utilitarian-geared considerations, the Parole Board
weighs factors, such as (1) the actor’s participation in programs while
incarcerated, which show “improvement of problems diagnosed at

65

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.52 (2020).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.51 (2020).
67 § 30:4-123.51b; § 2C:43-6.4.
68 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:71-3.48 (2020).
69 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.51(b) (2020).
70 Id. § 30:4-123.51(a).
71 New Jersey State Parole Board, A Brief Overview of the Parole Process in New Jersey
7 (Feb. 2002), https://www.nj.gov/parole/docs/ParoleProcess.pdf.
66
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admission or during incarceration”;72 (2) the actor’s employment
history and/or education;73 (3) the actor’s family history and current
familial relationships;74 and (4) proof of the actor’s change (for better or
worse) in his attitude toward others (or even himself).75 This
retributivism-first-utilitarian-second approach allows for culpability to
be assessed on the front end of punishment (in determining how long
an individual must be incarcerated before becoming eligible for parole),
with rehabilitation and reformation picking up the baton after
sentencing. This approach appears to incorporate the retributivist
principle that those who do wrong should be punished, without
sacrificing the ever-growing understanding that individuals can change
and redeem themselves to at least become law-abiding members of
society.
2. Supervision for Life
Though New Jersey’s Supervision for Life provision is relatively
simple, it does impose lifetime parole supervision in certain cases.76 The
provision illustrates that a hybrid of retributivist and utilitarian goals
can still be achieved without being “weak” on crime. Here, the New
Jersey legislature determined that lifetime supervision is mandatory in
some instances, a consequence that depends on the type of crime of
which an individual has been convicted.77 This seemingly culpabilitybased (read: retributivist) approach is contrasted with a different
provision regarding lifetime supervision that pulls on utilitarian
principles:
A court imposing sentence on a person who has been
convicted of endangering the welfare of a child . . . or an
attempt to commit either of these offenses shall include . . . a
special sentence of parole supervision for life . . . unless the
court finds on the record that the special sentence is not needed
to protect the community or deter the defendant from future
criminal activity.78

72

Id.
Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.4(a) (2020).
77 Id. (“Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a judge imposing
sentence on a person who has been convicted of aggravated sexual assault, sexual
assault . . . or an attempt to commit any of these offenses shall include . . . a special
sentence of parole supervision for life.”) (emphasis added).
78 Id. (emphasis added).
73
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Under a purely retributivist approach, community protection and
deterrence are merely a “happy surplus,” rather than an express
consideration.79 Thus, since the above-quoted passage of the lifetime
supervision section expressly takes those utilitarian considerations into
account, the hybrid nature of New Jersey’s parole system is reinforced.
3. Victim Input
One specific piece of parole legislation pertains to the ability of a
victim (or nearest relative of the victim in cases of manslaughter or
murder) to speak to the impact of the actor’s crime. Depending on the
circumstances of the parole hearing, the victim’s statements may be
written or videotaped.80 The victim’s statements may include “(1) [t]he
continuing nature and extent of any physical, psychological or emotional
harm or trauma suffered; (2) [t]he extent of any loss of earnings or
ability to work suffered by the victim; and (3) [t]he continuing effect of
the crime upon the victim’s family.”81 This provision is another example
of the blending of retributivist and utilitarian principles in the New
Jersey parole system. On the retributivist side, victim input seems to
speak directly to the actor’s continuing culpability or blameworthiness.
At the same time, however, one can view victim input as triggering the
sixth aim of punishment under the utilitarian framework—vengeance—
by allowing victims or their relatives to have their day in court. They
can feel like they have had a tangible impact on keeping the actor
incarcerated, as their input is considered in determining parole
eligibility. As noted earlier, this can help dissuade any desire to engage
in self-help. Thus, victim input continues to reinforce the hybrid nature
of parole in New Jersey.
4. Case Law Discussing the Hybrid Nature of Parole
The Supreme Court of New Jersey expounded upon the principles
and goals behind parole in State v. Black.82 There, the Black court
pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s characterization of parole,
noting that its purpose is “to help individuals reintegrate into society as
constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined
for the full term of the sentence imposed.”83 The Black court noted that
parole is “clearly” rehabilitative rather than punitive, and the court even
pointed to the fact that the current parole scheme in New Jersey calls for
79
80
81
82
83

Moore, supra note 57, at 180.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:71-3.48(a) (2020).
§ 10A:71-3.48(f).
State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438, 447–51 (1998).
Id. at 447 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972)).
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a presumption in favor of parole and a belief that the punitive aspects of
the sentence are complete once eligibility is triggered.84 This shows the
hybrid nature of parole in action, reinforcing the aforementioned
retributivism-first-utilitarian-second approach.
Following its discussion of the system’s overarching purposes, the
Black court turned to specific aspects of parole, noting that they, too, are
consistent with the rehabilitative (utilitarian) goal of parole. When
discussing parole restrictions, the court again pointed to the United
States Supreme Court’s commentary that restrictions, such as
mandatory reporting to parole officers, “are part of the administrative
system designed to assist parolees and offer them guidance.”85 The
Black court concluded that “the restrictions placed on parolees are . . .
rehabilitative rather than punitive in purpose.”86
Within the context of parole revocation (a mechanism that seems
punitive and retributivist), the Black court determined that
notwithstanding an accompanying deterrent component, parole
revocation still sits within the overarching rehabilitative purpose of
parole.87 The Black court continued to rely upon the Morrissey court’s
characterizations and quoted its interpretation of the process behind
revoking parole.88
One final parole condition illustrates the blend of retributivist and
utilitarian principles within the New Jersey parole system: restitution
and reparations. At first glance, this may appear to exhibit solely
retributivist qualities. How else could the prospect of having to lose
money and/or property as a result of your wrongful actions be
categorized as anything other than a retributive measure akin to an “eye
for an eye?” For the Trantino89 court, showing the hybrid nature of this
condition was easy: restitution and reparations assure “rehabilitation of
the offender and . . . prevent the recurrence of future criminal
conduct.”90 Remember, these explicit goals noted by the Trantino court
84

Id.
Id. (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 448.
88 Black, 153 N.J. at 447–51 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479–80) (“The first step
in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospective factual decision: whether
the parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of his parole. Only if
it is determined that the parolee did violate the conditions does the second question
arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to
protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation? . . . The second question involves
the application of expertise by the parole authority in making a prediction as to the
ability of the individual to live in society without committing antisocial acts.”).
89 In re Trantino, 446 A.2d 104 (N.J. 1982).
90 Id. at 111.
85
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are simply a “happy surplus” to many retributivists (thus, this implicates
both retributivist and utilitarian principles).91 The Trantino court
conducted a lengthy analysis of the goals behind restitution within the
context of a parole condition, and it interpreted this measure as a tool
to ensure the inmate realizes “the enormity of his conduct” and
“disgorge[s] the fruits of his offense” to restore those fruits to the
victim.92 The Trantino court even determined that requiring restitution
to the victim’s family members in the case of homicide does not run
afoul of the rehabilitative goal to be achieved.93 Finally, the Trantino
court expressly advocated for a careful calculation of the specific
amount of restitution to be ordered to preserve this hybrid scheme.94
B. Expungement
Expungement’s effect in New Jersey is simple: with only minor
exceptions, once an individual’s record is expunged, he can proceed with
his life as if his arrest/conviction did not happen, effectively
extinguishing a large aspect of the collateral consequences associated
with that initial arrest/conviction.95 Of all three facets of New Jersey
criminal laws discussed in this Comment, expungement appears to have
the least amount of retributivism in its recipe. According to the relevant
statutory provisions, and as interpreted in the foundational case of In re
LoBasso,96 once a petitioner can show the mechanical aspects of the
petition are satisfied (such as a clear record for the prior decade (or five
years, if the petitioner falls within a certain statutory provision that is
not pertinent to this Comment)), a presumption in favor of
expungement arises.97 This is not a static presumption, however; after
the initial presumption takes effect, the burden shifts to the state, which
is tasked with satisfying the reviewing court that the “‘need for the
availability of records’ outweighs the ‘desirability of having a person
freed from any disabilities’ associated with the conviction record.”98
The LoBasso court noted the policy behind expungement in New Jersey
91

Moore, supra note 57, at 180.
Trantino, 446 A.2d at 109.
93 Id. at 110 (“If a crime causes injury not only to the immediate victim but also to
others, as is the case with a homicide, there is no reason why payment to suffering third
persons will not make the offender appreciate the loss which he has caused as greatly
as payment to the victim would.”).
94 Id. at 111 (“If restitution or reparation is not honed closely to the contours of
rehabilitation, there is a danger that it will become nothing more than a weapon for
retribution, rather than a useful tool for personal progress and socialization.”).
95 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-27 (2020).
96 In re LoBasso, 33 A.3d 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
97 Id. at 547–48.
98 Id. at 548 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-14(b) (2020)).
92
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as focusing on not only enhancing the enforcement of New Jersey
criminal laws but also on aspects of crime prevention, reentry of
offenders into society, and promoting employability of former
offenders.99 The express reference to rectitude and disassociation from
unlawful activity in the expungement statutes themselves also lends
credence to the notion that expungement in New Jersey places a heavier
emphasis on utilitarian rather than retributivist objectives.100
To effectuate this policy, the LoBasso court developed a multifactor analysis that all reviewing courts should employ when faced with
a decision as to whether expungement is outweighed by the public
interest in retaining records.101 Overall, the reviewing court must
consider the “conduct and character” of the petitioner, as well as the
“nature of the offense” for which he was incarcerated.102
In analyzing the conduct and character, the court may consider
whether the petitioner has engaged in activities that have reduced the
risk that he will re-offend, or, on the other hand, whether the petitioner
has avoided engaging in activities that would increase the risk of reoffending.103 This consideration can include four sub-considerations:
(1) the employment and/or educational status of the petitioner (job
training or other education);104 (2) the petitioner’s compliance with
legal obligations other than the ones directly related to expungement,
such as child support, alimony, and parking tickets;105 (3) whether the
petitioner has maintained community ties or strong familial ties that
promote law-abiding tendencies;106 and (4) whether the petitioner has
cut ties with his past criminal cohorts.107

99 Id. at 549 (citing GOV. JON S. CORZINE, A STRATEGY FOR SAFE STREETS AND NEIGHBORHOODS ,
EXECUTIVE Summary 24 (2007)).)
100 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-32 (2020) (noting that expungement “shall be
construed with the primary objective of providing relief to the reformed offender who
has led a life of rectitude and disassociated himself with unlawful activity, but not to
create a system whereby persistent violators of the law or those who associate
themselves with continuing criminal activity have a regular means of expunging their
police and criminal records”).
101 In re LoBasso, 33 A.3d at 491–95.
102 Id. at 491–93.
103 Id. at 550.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 In re LoBasso, 33 A.3d at 550.
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The petitioner’s conduct while incarcerated or released on parole
or probation will certainly factor into the decision-making process for
expungement.108 Interestingly, but in line with ensuring that the
petitioner truly has rehabilitated himself and demonstrated a new path
in life, a court “may consider facts related to an arrest that did not lead
to a conviction” in between the incident to be potentially expunged and
the time of the expungement petition “if supported by cognizable
evidence, and the court makes an appropriate finding, after a hearing if
necessary.”109 It should be noted that this specifies arrests that did not
lead to a conviction because, in the case of expungement, a subsequent
conviction would bar the petitioner’s ability to expunge his record, as
the clean record is one of the mechanical requirements before the
balancing test can be reached.
Yet retributivist flavors are not wholly absent from expungement.
While reviewing the circumstances surrounding the “nature of the
offense,” the court may weigh facts “surrounding the grade and
definition of the offense, and the facts relating directly to the elements
of the offense.”110 This part of the inquiry can also include
circumstances surrounding the offense, such as the petitioner’s age at
the time of the offense or the presence of any “overbearing cohort.”111
Thus, it appears that facts relating to blameworthiness and culpability
do make it into the pot.
As mentioned above, however, the hybrid nature of expungement
skews closer to the utilitarian end. This is illustrated in LoBasso, as the
court reinforced that the focus is on rehabilitation, noting that even
when reviewing the circumstances of the underlying conviction, a court
may consider “cognizable evidence that the conviction record actually
has impeded the petitioner’s efforts to resume a productive, law-abiding
life.”112

108 Id. (“Exemplary performance on probation and early discharge would be a
positive factor. On the other hand, a record of probation violations, or an extension of
probation, would not.”).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 551 (“Thus, the nature of an eluding offense might include that a petitioner
drove at high speed or over a great distance to flee an officer, and the nature of risks
presented. The nature of an assault case might include the age of the victim.”).
111 Id. at 551–52.
112 Id. at 552.

SHUBECK (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

11/5/2020 10:27 PM

COMMENT

557

IV. NERA: ADDING TOO MUCH RETRIBUTIVIST HEAT TO THE DISH
NERA113 is a straightforward, mechanical piece of criminal
legislation. Simply put, NERA mandates that “[a] court imposing a
sentence of incarceration for a crime of the first or second degree
enumerated in subsection d. of this section shall fix a minimum term of
85% of the sentence imposed, during which the defendant shall not be
eligible for parole.”114 The offenses which fall within the purview of
NERA include: (1) murder;115 (2) Aggravated manslaughter or
manslaughter;116 (3) vehicular homicide;117 (4) aggravated assault;118
(5) disarming a law enforcement officer;119 (6) kidnapping;120 (7)
aggravated sexual assault;121 (8) sexual assault;122 (9) robbery;123 (10)
carjacking;124 (11) aggravated arson;125 (12) burglary;126 (13)
extortion;127 (14) “[b]ooby traps in manufacturing or distribution
facilities”;128 (15) drug-induced deaths that carry strict liability;129 (16)
terrorism;130 (17) “[p]roducing or possessing chemical weapons,
biological agents or nuclear or radiological devices”;131 (18) first-degree
racketeering;132 (19) firearms trafficking;133 and (20) “causing or
permitting a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act, knowing that the
act may be reproduced or reconstructed in any manner, or be part of an
exhibition or performance.”134

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2 (2020)
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(a).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(1).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(2).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(3).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(4).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(5) (2020).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(6).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(7).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(8).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(9).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(10).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(11) (2020).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(12).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(13).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(14).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(15).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(16).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(17) (2020).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(18).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(19).
Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(20).
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Supreme Court of New Jersey has admitted that legislative history
regarding NERA is “scant,” but the court has expressed that it is clear
that “the purpose of the Act was to ‘increase prison time for offenders
committing the most serious crimes in society.’”135 Indeed, the
Appellate Division has noted that punishment is the focus of the
legislative policy behind NERA.136 This purpose, when compared to
parole and expungement, should not sit right with the utilitarian. There
is no balancing to be done, nor are there considerations of rehabilitation
or the possibility that the actor could be restored to a meaningful
contributor to society. It is true, however, that the acts that trigger the
application of NERA are certainly those that society deems to be the
most heinous.
Based upon NERA’s mainly retributivist makeup, one may question
how it fits within the utilitarian framework. If one attempts to justify
NERA on utilitarian grounds, one may point to deterrence (both general
and specific), but they would likely fall short. In fact, pointing to any of
the utilitarian justifications likely raises a problem, due to one
potentially fatal shortcoming—the four hurdles.137 Specifically, the final
hurdle—utilitarian justifications—will not be satisfied when the
implementation of the punishment is needless and can be implemented
at a cheaper rate.138
It may be helpful to analyze this problem in dollars, and some slight
extrapolation will be in order. According to a 2018 survey of Atlantic
County jails, the average per-inmate/per-year incarceration cost was
$29,674.139 Recent statewide figures are not available, but using this
figure as the number across all New Jersey counties and multiplying it
by the previously mentioned figure of 19,212 incarcerated individuals
in New Jersey yields an estimated cost of $570 million statewide.
Considering that roughly 76% of incarcerated individuals in the New
Jersey prison system are serving mandatory minimum sentences140
(such as NERA), we can break this $570 million down to show that the
(very rough) estimated cost of mandatory minimum programs in New
Jersey is $433 million. Though the above-mentioned Atlantic County
135

State v. Thomas, 166 N.J. 560, 569 (2001) (citing The S. Law and Pub. Safety
Comm., Statement to S. B. No. 855 (N.J. 1996)).
136 State v. Jules, 784 A.2d 722, 725 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
137 See supra notes 30–40 and accompanying text.
138 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 137–38.
139 Molly Bilinski, Cost of Incarceration: South Jersey Jails by the Numbers, THE PRESS OF
ATLANTIC CITY (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/cost-ofincarceration-south-jersey-jails-by-the-numbers/article_7ca40896-d67f-5b2f-9a06a75e654aa2dc.html.
140 Offender Statistics, supra note 2.
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survey was conducted in 2012 and noted that some data points could
not be calculated at the time, a comparison between the economic costs
of restorative justice (which, as noted above, serves utilitarian goals)
and the traditional system yielded a finding that restorative justice is a
more cost-efficient approach to punishment.141 If one subscribes to the
utilitarian principle stated above that a less costly avenue automatically
renders a given punishment unjustifiable, graduate student Jillian M.
Furman’s study seems to point in a direction that would render
traditional mandatory minimum sentences (like NERA) potentially
unjustifiable.142
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the negative impact of NERA’s
heavy retributivist presence is to show how NERA frustrates the hybrid
objectives of other legislation, namely parole. The Appellate Division
dealt with this issue in State v. Webster.143 There, the court addressed
the fact that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by NERA
impacts an incarcerated individual’s ability to accumulate “front end”
work credits to lessen his sentence and be up for parole early:
The Parole Board interprets NERA to preclude the application
of commutation and work credits to the “front end” of a
sentence subject to NERA so as to lessen the period of parole
ineligibility, and instead recognizes those credits as applicable
only to the remaining base term or “back end” of a sentence.
As the result of the operation of statutory sentence
maximums, which effectively require a period of custody that
is less than the custodial term stated by the sentencing court,
the credits thus become of little or no substantive use to an
inmate, since the end of the period of parole ineligibility
imposed under NERA will usually be coterminous with the
maximum sentence pursuant to statute.144
This effectively means that an individual’s ability to reform himself
and accrue work credits while incarcerated ends up having no impact
on his overall sentence. In a world where incentives often bring about
action, this scheme acts as an empty offer, forcing inmates to serve as
much of a sentence as they would have had they accrued no work
141 Jillian M. Furman, An Economic Analysis of Restorative Justice, THE UNIV. OF MASS.
BOSTON 1, 67, 73 (Aug. 2012) (determining that restorative justice, from an economic
perspective, is “nearly six times more cost-effective that traditional criminal justice
methods”).
142 The utility of the Cape May example may not be very strong. The author of this
Comment does not purport to be a statistics expert, and he recognizes the shortcomings
of using one county’s prison statistics in estimating the cost of a prison system for an
entire state.
143 State v. Webster, 892 A.2d 688 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
144 Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
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credits. This may not discourage rehabilitation and reformation, but it
certainly does not encourage it, effectively leaving the utilitarian side of
the hybrid system with one arm tied behind its back.
Finally, if searching for examples of the effects of a heavily
retributivist-leaning system, one could point to California in the late
1970s.145 As Cullen chronicled in his discussion, California had, at one
time, been a shining example of an effective prison system—one in
which rehabilitation was a focus.146 Unfortunately, as the societal
climate shifted toward hating criminals and perceiving rehabilitation as
a weakness, the political process forced officials to drastically swing the
California prison system in the opposite direction, even going so far as
to declare the goal of its system as one of “punishment and not
rehabilitation.”147 The result, according to Cullen, was a system that was
“‘increasingly stark, depressing, and punitive,’ with offenders having
‘few genuine opportunities to change their lives.’”148 The key point to
take away here is not that the system was bad (which, according to
Cullen and Page, it was), but that once decisionmakers within the state
decided to turn toward a more balanced, hybrid system, it proved to be
a “daunting challenge.”149 Indeed, as Cullen notes, when a state turns
away from rehabilitation and opens the door for all things punitive and
retributivist, it lets in things that damage a system that values
rehabilitation rather than aid it.150
V. A MORE BALANCED DIET
The level of insight, knowledge, and overall skill to effectively
isolate and implement changes to NERA far surpass what the author of
this Comment possesses. But the overarching conclusion remains:
should NERA remain in its current form, its heavy retributivist
framework puts the efficacy of New Jersey’s hybrid scheme in jeopardy.
To visualize the author’s suggested split between NERA’s framework
and the framework of the other discussed aspects of New Jersey
criminal law, see the following diagram:

145

Cullen, supra note 23, at 332.
Id. at 331–32.
147 Id. at 332.
148 Id. (quoting JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PRISON
OFFICERS IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2011)).
149 Id. (citing PAGE, supra note 148).
150 Cullen, supra note 23, at 333 (“[T]he abandonment of rehabilitation created space
for the spread of new forms of . . . punitive interventions that, if anything, increased
recidivism. . . . Their utter ineffectiveness not only wasted untold millions of dollars but
also needlessly endangered public safety.”).
146
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If searching for any scintilla of evidence that this suggested split is
detrimental and potentially in need of reassessment, the reader need
look no further than an official report published by the New Jersey
Criminal Sentencing & Disposition Commission (“the Commission”) in
November of 2019.151 The Commission noted two principles on which
its findings stood: (1) “individuals convicted of crimes should spend no
more time in prison than is necessary to achieve the purposes of
sentencing”;152 and (2) “to the extent individuals must spend time in
prison, that time should be used as productively as possible to
encourage rehabilitation and prepare for their return to society.”153 If
this Comment has done even part of its job, the readers should have bells
and whistles going off, alerting them to the fact that the Commission’s
first principle seems to skew toward the retributivist end of the
spectrum, while the second principle skews toward the utilitarian end.
Thus, it appears that the Commission desires to bring NERA closer to
the hybrid structure of other aspects of the New Jersey criminal system.
The Commission makes various recommendations in its report, but
its third touches directly on NERA: the Commission recommends that
the mandatory sentence for second-degree robbery and burglary should
be reduced from 85% to 50%.154 The Commission based its decision, in
part, on the fact that those offenses (1) often result in no physical injury
and (2) are charged with a relatively high frequency.155 The Commission
also noted economic savings associated with these changes.156 The
Commission did not quantify the savings, and this Comment does not
attempt to do so.157 But the Commission did conclude that the savings
can be reinvested back into the system, ideally to be used to identify
strategic areas in which public safety can be increased.158 The
151

N.J. CRIMINAL SENTENCING & DISPOSITION COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT (2019) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT].
152 Id. at 2.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 23–24.
155 Id. at 24.
156 Id. at 33.
157 This Comment has already engaged in enough speculative statistics in Part IV.
158 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 151, at 33.
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Commission’s report was just one small step in the direction of bringing
NERA toward a more hybrid status, but achieving a balanced diet takes
time.
VI. CONCLUSION
New Jersey lawmakers should view the current version of NERA
through the lens of punishment theory. By placing more emphasis on
the hybrid scheme that our current system seems to embody, potential
future NERA alterations could bring this piece of legislation more in line
with the other discussed aspects of the New Jersey criminal system. Not
only would this approach make our state criminal justice system more
consistent, but it could also lead to an overall healthier society. This
most certainly does not advocate for an outright repeal of NERA or an
approach that rewards the type of offenders that would normally fall
within the purview of NERA; rather, it aims to make sure those
individuals are held accountable with an appropriate level of force while
making sure they are given the opportunity to reform themselves and
benefit society.

